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WILL THE SUPREME COURT STILL “SELDOM STRAY VERY
FAR”?: REGIME POLITICS IN A POLARIZED AMERICA
KEVIN J. MCMAHON*
I. INTRODUCTION
It had never happened before; never in the history of the presidency; 
never in the history of Supreme Court nominations. On April 7, 2017, the 
United States Senate confirmed a nominee for the High Court appointed by 
a President who had failed to win the popular vote with the support of a 
majority of senators who had garnered fewer votes—indeed far fewer 
votes— in their most recent elections than their colleagues in opposition. 
Specifically, the combined vote totals of the senators opposing Neil Gor-
such, President Donald Trump’s nominee for the Supreme Court, were 
nearly 22 million more than those in support of the newest Justice 
(76,507,374 to 54,557,602). Given the importance of the vote to the notion 
of democratic legitimacy, in this Article I consider the historical signifi-
cance of a minority President appointing a “minority Justice.”
To be sure, as displayed in Table 1, Gorsuch was not the first Justice 
confirmed by a group of senators who had collected fewer votes in their 
most recent elections than those in opposition. That distinction belongs to 
Clarence Thomas, the George H. W. Bush appointee who stirred controver-
sy with his strident conservatism—combined with the fact that he was se-
lected to replace the liberal legend Thurgood Marshall—and due to Anita 
Hill’s accusations of sexual harassment.1 But, of course, then Vice Presi-
dent Bush had captured the White House with a relatively comfortable 
victory over Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis, winning forty states 
and 53.4 percent of the popular vote (a 7.72 percent margin). In securing 
confirmation to the High Court, Samuel Alito also did so with a majority of 
senators who had garnered fewer votes than those in opposition. And like 
Donald Trump, George W. Bush initially captured the presidency with 
* John R. Reitemeyer Professor of Political Science, Trinity College
1. On the Thomas confirmation, see MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF 
SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (2004), and JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE
SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1994).
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fewer popular votes than his Democratic opponent, Vice President Al Gore 
(and with the aid of the Supreme Court decision of Bush v. Gore2). Howev-
er, with no vacancies occurring in his first term, Bush did not make an ap-
pointment to the Court as a minority President. And while his reelection 
victory in 2004 over Senator John Kerry was a narrow one, Bush did win 
thirty-one states and a majority of the popular vote (50.3 percent; a 2.46 
percent margin). He appointed Alito the following year. (For purposes of 
comparison, I have also included in Table 1 the most closely contested vote 
for a nominee appointed by a Democratic president since the Thomas selec-
tion; namely, Barack Obama’s choice of Elena Kagan in 2010.)
Table 1: The Senate Popular Vote & Recent Contested Confirmations




























































So the Supreme Court now includes three Justices who were con-
firmed by a majority of senators who had received fewer votes than those 
in opposition, with the newest Justice appointed by a minority President. 
This observation led me to think about the connection between the popular 
vote in presidential elections and Supreme Court nominations and confir-
2. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
President    
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mations, and to consider how these three recent confirmations fit within the 
historical record. More specifically, I explore three areas of interest in this 
Article. First, I review some of the foundational work of regime politics 
theory, a theory in political science that suggests that Supreme Court doc-
trine is a creation of the political regime that put the Justices in place. This 
thinking informed Robert McCloskey’s work, and his 1960 conclusion that 
the Court has “seldom strayed very far from the mainstreams of 
American life.”3 In doing so, I consider whether the current polarized 
state of American politics undermines the main assumptions of this 
literature. Second, I explore the entirety of Supreme Court appointments 
since the presidential election of 1824, the first election where states
—at least most of them—chose electors based on the popular vote. I do so 
to examine whether there is a historical correlation between the 
popular vote and popular vote margin of a President and the ease or 
difficulty his Supreme Court nominees faced in the Senate 
confirmation process. Finally, I consider whether this recent 
development of “minority Justices” matters at all, given the fact that 
the framers of the Constitution purposely decided to provide each 
state with two senators, knowing that those senators from states with 
smaller popula-tions would represent fewer—at times far fewer—citizens 
than those with larger ones.
II. THE ELECTORAL ASSUMPTIONS OF EARLY REGIME POLITICS
THEORY
At its roots, regime politics theory considers the well-worn conclusion 
that the Supreme Court “follows the election returns.” The origins of the 
theory date back to the 1950s when both traditional legal scholars and po-
litical scientists were struggling to understand the place of the Court’s 1954 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education4 in American democracy. Oppos-
ing the traditional “legalistic” view that the Court sits to protect minorities 
from majority tyranny, political scientist Robert Dahl argued in 1957 that 
in actuality the Court usually operated as an arm of the national governing 
alliances that historically dominated American politics. For Dahl, the Court 
is seldom in conflict with the political (majoritarian) branches, and usually 
“operates to confer legitimacy, not simply on the particular and parochial 
3. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 225 (Sanford Levinson ed., 4th 
ed. 2005).
4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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policies of the dominant political alliance, but upon the basic patterns of 
behavior required for the operation of a democracy.”5
To reach this conclusion, Dahl relied on realignment theory of partisan 
change.6 While he never specifically mentioned realignment theory in his 
1957 article, it is implied throughout. Its clearest articulation comes in his 
concluding comments:
National politics in the United States, as in other stable democra-
cies, is dominated by relatively cohesive alliances that endure for long 
periods of time. One recalls the Jeffersonian alliance, the Jacksonian, the 
extraordinary long-lived Republican dominance of the post-Civil War 
years, and the New Deal alliance shaped by Franklin Roosevelt. Each is 
marked by a break with past policies, a period of intense struggle, fol-
lowed by consolidation, and finally decay and disintegration of the alli-
ance.
Except for short-lived transitional periods when the old alliance is 
disintegrating and the new one is struggling to take control of political 
institutions, the Supreme Court is inevitably a part of the dominant na-
tional alliance7
So for Dahl, the political alliances that develop after electoral rea-
lignments ensure the Court will not significantly alter the policy outcomes 
of democracy— at least not for long. Given the institutional weakness of 
the courts, the propensity of Supreme Court vacancies, and the President’s 
power to fill those vacancies with nominees whose political philosophies 
are not radically different from both his own and a majority of senators, it 
would be unlikely that the judiciary will, “for more than a few years at 
most, stand against any major alternatives sought by a lawmaking majori-
ty.”8 In other words, as political scientist Jonathan Casper summarized, 
since
[n]ational politics in this country is generally dominated by relatively
stable alliances of political interests, the Supreme Court—whose mem-
bers are socialized by the same forces as are others active in politics and
whose membership is selected by representatives of these political inter-
ests—is itself typically a member of such stable coalitions.9
5. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 295 (1957).
6. On realignment theory, see generally WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND
THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1970), V.O. Key, Jr., A Theory of Critical Elections, 17 J.
POL. 3 (1955); and JAMES SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT AND 
REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1983).
7. Dahl, supra note 5, at 293.
8. Id. at 285.
9. Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
50, 51–52 (1976); see also David Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court,
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In this sense, humorist Peter Finley Dunne’s “Mr. Dooley” was correct 
when he quipped: “th’ supreme coort follows th’ iliction returns.”
Three years after the publication of Dahl’s article, Robert McCloskey 
advanced a similar line of argument, concluding that the Court has rarely
“lagged far behind nor forged far ahead of America.”10 While McCloskey 
did not offer a thorough explanation for the Court’s historical alliance with 
the political branches, he seemingly agreed with Dahl by writing:
This is not to suggest that the historical Court has slavishly countered the 
public pulse, assessed the power relationships that confronted it, 
and shaped its decisions accordingly. The process in question is a good 
deal more subtle than that. We might come closer to the truth if we said 
that the judges have often agreed with the main current of public 
sentiment because they were themselves part of that current and not 
because they fear to disagree with it.11
In the 1970s, yet another political scientist, Martin Shapiro, took this 
argument to another level; writing that successful judicial activism follow-
ing the New Deal was a direct result of the election of 1932. For Shapiro, 
the Warren Court “received broad support because, a decade or two after 
the New Deal, it finally moved to incorporate service to the New Deal vic-
tors into constitutional law, just as Congress and the presidency earlier had 
incorporated such service into statutory law.”12 Thus, “the Supreme Court 
got away with its activism because it was activism on behalf of the winners 
not the losers of Americans politics.”13 More than a decade later, he added: 
“The voting realignment of 1932 led to a realignment of constitutional law 
that was completed by 1942. The Republican Court [which] had served 
Republican clients . . . [was replaced] by the new Democratic Court [that] 
was united in its determination to end this service to Republicans.”14
In reaching these conclusions, scholars advancing these lines of argu-
ments typically depended on realignment theory and the reliability of the 
appointment process to explain the representative connection between the 
1973 WIS. L. REV. 790; Richard Y. Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 795 (1975); JOHN B. GATES, THE SUPREME COURT AND PARTISAN REALIGNMENT: A
MACRO- AND MICROLEVEL PERSPECTIVE (1992); William Lasser, The Supreme Court in Periods of 
Critical Realignment, 47 J. POL. 1174 (1985).
10. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 3, at 224.
11. Id.
12. Martin M. Shapiro, The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger, in THE NEW AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 194 (Anthony King ed., 1978).
13. Id.
14. Martin Shapiro, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Future of the Supreme Court, in AN
ESSENTIAL SAFEGUARD 145 (D. Grier Stephenson, Jr. ed., 1991).
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Court and the voting public—as Dahl did15—or have argued—as Shapiro 
did—that the political branches aren’t that democratic anyway, so it’s ap-
propriate for the courts “to act when the legislatures won’t.”16 In support of 
the first of these arguments, scholars have pointed out that the Court rarely 
invalidates major congressional statutes; that it often supports the govern-
ment’s position when the United States is a party in a case; and that court-
curbing proposals introduced in response to controversial decisions seldom 
succeed in Congress. In support of the second, Shapiro, for example, con-
siders congressional and presidential politics. With regard to the former, he 
writes: “[T]here is no reason to believe that the self-preservation demands 
of Congress are likely to correspond to the demands of the majority, or that 
each social interest is likely to receive that degree of attention which its 
numerical strength in the population might warrant.”17 And to the latter, he 
notes that the presidency “can hardly be understood in simplistic majoritar-
ian terms.”18
With the publication of The Least Dangerous Branch in 1962, Alex-
ander Bickel reshaped thinking about the Supreme Court’s position in 
American democracy, especially in the legal academy.19 In The Least Dan-
gerous Branch, Bickel argued that judicial review created a “counter-
majoritarian difficulty” for the democratic system of government in the 
United States.20 The counter-majoritarian difficulty is actually two ques-
tions rolled into one phrase. The first is empirical: Does the Court act in a 
counter-majoritarian fashion—that is, consistently strike down legislation 
or executive orders passed or issued by democratically elected officials? 
The second question is a normative one: If the Court does issue decisions 
that can properly be described as counter-majoritarian, is it in accordance 
with an American conception of democracy?
15. See, for example, JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 332 (1993). They write: “[T]he displacement of the liberal Warren Court with 
increasingly conservative Burger and Rehnquist Courts did not result because of congruence with 
public sentiment. It resulted because Nixon, Reagan, and Bush populated the judiciary with persons in 
their own ideological image.” Id.
16. See MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 240–41 (1964); 
MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 17–21, 32 
(1966) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH]; see also SANDFORD LEVINSON, OUR 
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE 
PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
17. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 16, at 21.
18. Id. at 22.
19. See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (Yale Univ. Press
1986) (1962).
20. Id. at 16–22.
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Political scientists like Dahl focused their sights on the first question, 
and argued that the counter-majoritarian force allegedly created by the 
Court was actually quite weak. In other words, independent judicial policy-
making rarely takes place because it is “somewhat unrealistic to suppose 
that a Court whose members are recruited in the fashion of Supreme Court 
Justices would long hold to norms of Right or Justice substantially at odds 
with the rest of the political elite.”21 For Dahl, except in those rare instanc-
es of transition, the second question was all but moot. In contrast, academic
lawyers stressed the normative aspect of the counter-majoritarian difficulty, 
and by appealing to political theory, a number of them purported to have 
“solved” it.22 For his part, Dahl did not wish to expend his energy on 
“proving that, even if the Court consistently defends minorities against 
majorities, nonetheless it is a thoroughly ‘democratic’ institution.”23 For 
him,
to affirm that the Court ought to act in this way is to deny that popular 
sovereignty and political equality ought to prevail in this coun-
try. . . . [N]o amount of tampering with democratic theory, can conceal 
the fact that a system in which the policy preferences of minorities pre-
vail over majorities is at odds with the traditional criteria for distinguish-
ing a democracy from other political systems.24
In turn, Dahl was determined to show how democracy was viable 
when the Court, in applying vague provisions like the Due Process Clauses, 
makes judgments that shape policy. For him, if the Court “flagrantly op-
poses the major policies of the dominant alliance,”25 it will seriously jeop-
ardize its legitimacy. But again, that only happened on rare occasions 
because, as he concluded:
[T]he Court is almost powerless to affect the course of national policy. In 
the absence of substantial agreement within the alliance, an attempt by 
the Court to make national policy is likely to lead to disaster, as the Dred 
Scott decision and the early New Deal cases demonstrate. . . .
. . . .
. . . Thus, the Court is least effective against a current lawmaking 
majority—and evidently least inclined to act. It is most effective when it 
sets the bounds of policy for officials, agencies, state governments or 
21. Dahl, supra note 5, at 291.
22. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); RONALD 
DWORKIN. FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
23. Dahl, supra note 5, at 283.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 293.
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even regions, a task that has come to occupy a very large part of the 
Court’s business.26
For the same reasons the Court cannot for long operate in a counter-
majoritarian fashion, new legal criteria can be incorporated into its deci-
sions. That is, given the stability of the national political alliance and the 
reliability of the appointment process, new Justices may arrive at the Court 
with new legal ideas explicitly or implicitly approved by the President and 
the Senate. And “within somewhat narrow limits set by the basic policy 
goals of the dominant alliance, the Court can make national policy.”27 Ex-
cept when it is supported by the alliance, however, Dahl argues the Court 
does not play a significant role in the national policy-making process.
In the 1990s, another group of scholars revisited this question of the 
connection between the democratically-elected branches of government 
and the courts. This exploration effectively began with the 1993 publication 
of Mark Graber’s seminal article, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legisla-
tive Deference to the Judiciary.28 There, Graber argued that instead of pre-
senting a counter-majoritarian problem, judicial review is more likely to 
present, a “nonmajoritarian difficulty”—that is, “when the real controversy 
is between different [minority] members of the dominant national coalition, 
or ‘the clashing majority difficulty’ when the real controversy is between 
lawmaking majorities of different governing institutions.”29 Judicial activi-
ty in these times, then, cannot be adequately explained by exploring the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty since there is usually no clear majority on 
many of the most controversial issues of the day. As Graber explains:
[A]ll exercises of the judicial power do not have the same relationship to 
democratic values. Realistic theories of the judicial function, thus, must 
examine the extent to which particular instances of judicial review actu-
ally promote or retard deliberate policy-making, majoritarianism, and 
political accountability. In some instances, judicial review is clearly in-
consistent with ordinary understandings of democratic majoritarianism.30
Following Graber, numerous scholars added to the regime politics or 
“political regimes” analysis, providing examples of how politics and law 
interact to make policy on a variety of matters. While most have been em-
pirical-based, showing on how politics works to construct law, democratic 
linkages are often apparent. For example, in my own work on the Nixon 
26. Id. at 293–94.
27. Id.
28. Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993). 
29. Id. at 37.
30. Id. at 72.
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administration, I argue that not only did Nixon successfully use the powers 
of the presidency to shape the Court doctrinally, he used the Court issue as 
a means of attracting votes at the ballot box.31 While not a focus of that 
work, the majoritarianism link between successes in electoral politics and 
doctrinal shifts with the nation’s highest tribunal is clear. Nevertheless,
following Graber, regimes politics scholars have been less interested in the 
need to “prove” the legitimacy of the Court’s action as Dahl set out to do.
Still, the recent shift in American politics does raise some interesting 
questions about judicial legitimacy in an age of polarized politics. After all, 
Dahl’s and McCloskey’s conclusions seemingly assume the presence of 
enduring political regimes that attain and hold office with decisive—even 
landslide—electoral victories. But what happens if the popular vote and the 
Electoral College results are out of alignment? Does it matter, for example, 
that the Democratic presidential nominee has won the popular vote in the 
six of the last seven presidential elections (from 2000 to 2016), yet Repub-
lican Presidents have appointed a majority of the sitting Justices? Given 
this recent trend in the popular/electoral vote divide, it seems reasonable to 
consider the possibility of the alternative to McCloskey’s conclusions—of 
a Court out of line with America—and what it may mean for its politics 
and its law; indeed for the nation itself. Before considering that question, I 
explore the historical record of a President’s overall popular vote and popu-
lar vote margin on the one hand, and the Senate’s treatment of his High 
Court nominees on the other. I show that in one sense the current situation 
in which the Senate consistently contests confirmations is not unprecedent-
ed. At the same time, the confirmation of “minority Justices” is an entirely 
new development in American politics. Put simply, for much of American 
history, few nominees who faced significant opposition in the Senate be-
came a justice.
III. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND THE HISTORICAL RARITY OF A 
CONTENTIOUS SENATE
In this section, I consider the extent to which there has been a relation-
ship between a President’s performance at the polls and the Senate’s treat-
ment of his Supreme Court nominees since the popular vote first mattered 
in the presidential election of 1824.32 To begin, consider Charts 1 and 2 
31. See generally KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL 
LIBERALISM AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (2011).
32. I do not count certain nominations. More specifically, I treat the following four instances as 
single nominations: 1) if a President nominated the same jurist more than once, but the Senate did not 
act on any of those later nominations or did not act differently on them (i.e., President John Tyler’s
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below. Chart 1 shows three things: 1) the popular vote percentage of the 
successful presidential candidate from 1824 to 2016; 2) the popular vote 
percentage margin of the successful presidential candidate, again from 
1824 to 2016; and 3) the percentage of senators opposing each Supreme 
Court nomination made from 1826 to 2017.33 Chart 2 also shows the over-
all popular vote and the margin of the popular vote for the winner of the 
presidential elections from 1824 to 2016, but (compared to Chart 1) only 
shows the percentage of senators opposing each successful Supreme Court 
confirmation.
nominations of John Spencer, Reuben Walworth, and Edward King; 2) if the Senate did not act on a 
nomination, but did consider the same nominee when the same President re-nominated him again soon 
thereafter (i.e., William Hornblower, Pierce Butler, and the second John M. Harlan); 3) if the nomina-
tion was contingent on the success of another nomination (i.e., Homer Thornberry’s nomination to fill 
Abe Fortas’s associate seat pending Fortas’s confirmation as Chief Justice, which failed); and 4) if a 
President withdrew a nomination to fill an associate position in order to appoint the same nominee to 
Chief Justice (i.e., John Roberts).
33. I treat voice votes for Senate confirmation as unanimous votes. While it is clear that some 
voice votes did not mean that all voting senators supported a particular nominee, in this Article I am 
focusing on nominations that attracted significant opposition (more than 25 percent of voting senators). 
It seems reasonable to conclude that those confirmed by voice vote did not attract this level of opposi-
tion. Moreover, since there is no historical record of the level of opposition for these votes, my only 
options were to exclude them entirely or treat them as unanimous. Given the number of voice votes 
over the period under consideration, the first option was hardly one at all. Therefore, I chose the admit-
tedly problematic second one. Additionally, when the Senate did not have a floor vote on a nomination, 
I reasoned that at a minimum the number of senators in opposition was at least equal to the number 
necessary to filibuster that nomination. Therefore, in those cases, the percentage of senators opposed in 
all the charts is equal to the number of senators necessary to filibuster the nomination at the time the 
president made it.
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Chart 1: Presidential Popular Vote and Supreme Court Nominations 1824–
2017
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Chart 2: Presidential Popular Vote & Supreme Court Confirmations, 
1824–2017
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Four things are quite clear from the historical record. First, when a 
nominee was out of line with the interests of the Senate—whatever the 
reason—one of three events occurred: The Senate tabled the nomination 
(and took no further action), rejected the nominee, or essentially forced the 
President to withdraw the nomination in the face of a negative vote. (There 
were also two instances where the Senate confirmed a nominee, but he 
declined to serve on the Court.) Indeed, as detailed below, during long 
stretches of American history, few nominees who confronted conflict in the 
Senate reached the high bench. (I define a contested confirmation as one in 
which 25 percent of voting senators opposed the nomination.)34 This reality 
is particularly significant for McCloskey’s conclusions since it may help 
explain why the Court was often in alignment with the political branches of 
the federal government.
Second, as Dahl suggests, for much of American history, one political 
party was dominant at the national level and the Presidents representing 
those parties/regimes were able to secure easy confirmation of their selec-
tions for the High Court; typically with little or no opposition in the Senate. 
Yet, this was not always the case. As displayed in Charts 1 and 2, the most 
contentious periods in the Senate for Supreme Court nominees correlated 
with presidential weakness at the polls, both in terms of the overall popular 
vote and the margin of the popular vote. More specifically, the data show 
that during eras of tight presidential contexts, Court nominees faced more 
contentiousness in the Senate. To be sure, this reality did not necessarily 
extend to within the periods outlined below. In other words, this does not 
mean that every President who won a narrow victory was destined to wit-
ness his nominees for the Court face difficulty in the Senate. Nevertheless, 
elections did matter. Most importantly, there was a greater likelihood a 
nomination would face a contentious Senate during an election year or in 
the year after a narrow win by the appointing President, which I define as 
when the victor won less than 50 percent of the popular vote in a two-
candidate contest and by less than a 5 percent margin. Third, nominations 
that occurred at the end of a partisan period, when the regime’s authority 
34. Elsewhere, I define a contested confirmation as one in which at least 20 percent of the voting 
senators oppose the nomination. Kevin J. McMahon, Presidents, Political Regimes, and Contentious 
Supreme Court Nominations: A Historical Institutional Model, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 919, 920 
(2007); Kevin J. McMahon, Confirming Chiefs: Ideology, Opportunity, and the Court’s Center Chair,
in THE CHIEF JUSTICE: APPOINTMENT AND INFLUENCE 140 (David J. Danelski & Artemus Ward eds., 
2016). However, both of those works focus only on nominations made after 1900. Given the conten-
tiousness of the confirmation process during the nineteenth century and that a few of the votes in the 
twentieth century barely surpassed the 20 percent figure, I have raised the contentiousness bar to 25 
percent in this analysis to better reflect the nature of opposition during the nearly two centuries of 
Supreme Court nominations under consideration in this Article.
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was in steep decline, were more likely to be contested in the Senate. Final-
ly, and least significantly, nominations made by lame duck Presidents, 
those in power after their successor had already won election, typically 
confronted uncertainty in the Senate. Notably, all of the lame-duck nomina-
tions occurred in the nineteenth century.
Table 2: Situations when Senate Contested Most Confirmations, 
1826–1969








1 Election Year 12 (37.5%) 9 (34.6%)
2 Year following a 
Close Election
7 (21.8%) 7 (26.9%)
3 End of a Partisan Era 5* (15.6%) 5* (19.2%)
4 Lame Duck 
Presidency
2** (6.3%) 0
Exceptions 6 (18.8%) 5 (19.2%)
Total 32 26
*These nominations are distinct from Situations 1 or 2.
** These nominations are distinct from Situations 1, 2 or 3.
In the following sections, I show that the vast majority of closely-
contested successful confirmations or failed nominations in the nearly cen-
tury and a half between the years of 1826 to 1969 occurred in one or more 
of these four situations: during an election year; in the year immediately 
following a close election; at the end of a partisan era; or, during the lame 
duck days of a presidency. In fact, as Table 2 shows, 81.3 percent—twenty-
six of thirty-two—of contested nominations fit into one of these four cate-
gories. Moreover, if the contested nominations from the early presidencies 
of John Q. Adams and Andrew Jackson are excluded from the analysis, 
80.1 percent—twenty-one of twenty-six—of the contested nominations 
made from mid-1837 to 1969 fit into the first three categories. Four of the 
five nominations that don’t were made in the aftermath of the Civil War 
(during the presidencies of Andrew Johnson or Ulysses S. Grant). Finally, 
only seven of those twenty-six contested nominees won Senate confirma-
tion. In other words, in nearly three-quarters of the cases (73.1 percent), 
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when a nominee was contested in the Senate during this time period, he did 
not become a Justice. This figure highlights the importance of Senate ob-
jections to Supreme Court nominees. While the President possessed the 
sole authority to make the selections for the high bench, the Senate’s voice 
was nevertheless powerful, thereby enhancing the democratic legitimacy of 
the choices. This fact adds to the explanation of why, as Dahl and McClos-
key suggest, the Court was often in alignment with the political branches.
A. Jacksonian Era
While Charts 1 and 2 essentially confirm Dahl’s 1957 assumptions 
about the shifts in the Court’s membership, I outline more nuances by sepa-
rating the data into six historical periods. Charts 3 and 4 highlight the Jack-
sonian period between 1824 and 1860.
Chart 3: Presidential Popular Vote & Supreme Court Nominations, Jack-
sonian Era
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Chart 4: Presidential Popular Vote & Supreme Court Confirmations, Jack-
sonian Era
This period is easily the most distinct from the others with Presidents 
making numerous unsuccessful nominations, especially John Tyler. Never-
theless, the principles I outlined above hold. Of the sixteen nominees who 
confronted conflict in the Senate during the Jacksonian era, the Senate con-
sidered all but two in one or more of the situations outlined above in Table 
2. More specially, it considered seven in an election year (situation 1) and 
another four in the year following a close election (situation 2). It consid-
ered another at the end of the era (situation 3) that was distinct from situa-
tions 1 and 2 (meaning it didn’t also occur during one of those situations). 
Finally, two more of the contested nominees were appointed by a lame-
duck President (situation 4), and during a time distinct from the first three 
situations.
To be sure, President Andrew Jackson had more difficulty than might 
have been expected given the size of his electoral victories, but the Senate 
ultimately confirmed all of his nominees.35 Indeed, one of the two nomina-
35. Although as I note below, one—William Smith—declined to serve.
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tions that did not fall into any of the four situations was Jackson’s first 
nomination of Roger Taney in 1835. However, Jackson nominated Taney a 
year later for Chief Justice, and after a contested vote, the Senate confirmed 
him. Jackson’s nominations are also unusual because he selected two men 
for the Court after the election of 1836. Both of those lame-duck nomina-
tions were for newly-created seats on the Court, and both were contested in 
the Senate.
It is also important to note that the President who had the greatest dif-
ficulty in securing confirmation for his nominees during this period was 
John Tyler, the first Vice President to assume the presidency due to the 
death of his predecessor. Tyler had been part of the Whig ticket with Wil-
liam Henry Harrison in 1840, but President Harrison died after only serving 
for thirty days in the White House. Tyler faced difficulty from the start as 
his detractors derisively referred to him as “His Accidency.” Ultimately, 
Tyler was only able to put one jurist on the Court, even though two Justices 
died during his time in office. He nominated five men in total (two twice 
and one three times). All of these nominations took place in the election 
year of 1844 or in the final days of his presidency in 1845. Tyler broke 
with his party in 1841, and therefore was not the Whig candidate in 1844. 
Instead, his main adversary among the Whigs—Henry Clay—headed up 
the ticket. Clay lost to Democrat James K. Polk in a close race that year. 
Millard Fillmore confronted a similar problem as Tyler. Fillmore assumed 
the presidency after the death of Zachary Taylor. And like Tyler, he strug-
gled to get his selections confirmed, succeeding in only one of four at-
tempts (two as a lame duck President).
Finally, during this period, only four nominees joined the Court after a 
contested confirmation vote in the Senate. Those four Justices were: Roger 
Taney (1836 Senate vote); Philip Barbour (1836); John Catron (1837); and 
Nathan Clifford (1858). A divided Senate also confirmed William Smith in 
1837, but he declined to serve. John Catron ultimately filled that seat, fol-
lowing his conflictual Senate confirmation. Notably, all of the Jackson’s 
nominees who confronted conflict in the Senate did so near the end of his 
presidency. Indeed, the second Taney, Barbour, Smith, and Catron votes 
took place during the election year of 1836 (won by his Vice President, 
Martin Van Buren) or in the final days of Jackson’s presidency in 1837. 
The contested confirmation of Clifford occurred in the final throes of the 
Jacksonian regime, after a weak President James Buchanan nominated him 
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to replace Benjamin Curtis, who had resigned from the Court to protest its 
decision in Dred Scott.36
B. Civil War Period
The Civil War period witnessed a high rate of contested nominees. In-
deed, the years between the end of the Ulysses S. Grant presidency in 1877 
and the conclusion of the Civil War period with the inauguration of Wil-
liam McKinley in 1897 are perhaps the closest comparison to the politics of 
today with regard to Supreme Court nominations and confirmations. Dur-
ing these two decades, presidential election after presidential election re-
sulted in narrow victories in which the winning candidate never received 
more than 50 percent of the popular vote, including two times when the 
victor lost the popular vote. In the Senate, High Court nominees confronted 
a confirmation gauntlet as seven of seventeen nominees (41 percent) were 
contested. But even before this time of close presidential contests, Presi-
dent Grant’s choices for the Court were contested at an historical high rate 
(37 percent). Overall, during the Civil War period, there were ten contested 
nominations. Two each occurred during situations 1, 2, and 3 (for a total of 
six). A lame-duck President chose one of the contested nominees (situation 
4), but that nomination was not distinct since it occurred in the year follow-
ing a close election (situation 2). Four others were exceptions, meaning that 
they were not made in any of the four situations described above (Table 2). 
President Grant made three of those selections. His predecessor, Andrew 
Johnson, made the other.
36. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amend-
ment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Chart 5: Presidential Popular Vote & Supreme Court Nominations, Civil 
War Period
Chart 6: Presidential Popular Vote & Supreme Court Confirmations, Civil 
War Period
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In entire Civil War period, only three jurists survived a contested con-
firmation battle to take a seat on the high bench. The others had no action 
taken on their nomination, were rejected by the Senate, were withdrawn, or 
in one case, declined to serve after being confirmed. The three contested 
Justices were: Stanley Matthews (1881), Lucius Lamar (1888), and Mel-
ville Fuller (1888). Rutherford B. Hayes first nominated Matthews as a 
lame-duck President in 1881, but the Senate took no action. Fellow Repub-
lican James Garfield, the victor of the close presidential election of 1880, 
re-nominated Matthews in the first days of his presidency (situation 2). 
Senators objected to the choice once again, but nevertheless, he was con-
firmed by the narrowest of margins, 24–23. The Senate confirmed Presi-
dent Grover Cleveland’s choices of Lamar and Fuller in the election year of 
1888 (situation 1), a contest Republican Benjamin Harrison won even 
though Cleveland, a Democrat, captured the popular vote.
C. Republican Era
With the election of the William McKinley in 1896 and the dominance 
of the Republican Party over the next thirty-six years, Supreme Court nom-
inees faced a friendlier Senate in route to confirmation during this era. Only 
four nominees confronted a contentious confirmation process. Three won 
confirmation—Mahlon Pitney (1912), Louis Brandeis (1916), and Charles 
Evans Hughes (1930)—with approximately a third of the voting senators in 
opposition. The other—John J. Parker—suffered defeat in the Senate. As 
with the previous periods, the general principles I outlined above held true. 
Presidents Taft nominated Pitney in the last full year of his presidency; the 
same year he finished third in the presidential election of 1912 (situation 1). 
President Wilson chose Brandeis in the next presidential election year (sit-
uation 1), and while he won reelection, he did so by the narrowest margin 
of any victor during the Republican era (49.25 percent of the popular vote 
with a 3.14 percent margin). During this period of landslides, Wilson also 
won only 52.2 percent of the electoral vote. And if he lost the state of Cali-
fornia—which he won by less than 4000 votes (.38 percent)—he would 
have lost the presidency. In all other elections during these years, the win-
ning candidate captured at least 60 percent of the electoral vote, and more 
often than not, more than 70 percent of the Electoral College delegates. 
Notably, the Brandeis vote was the first contested confirmation in the re-
constituted Senate. Beginning in 1913, after the ratification of the Seven-
teenth Amendment, senators were elected directly by the voters of their 
states rather than by state legislatures.
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Chart 7: Presidential Popular Vote & Supreme Court Nominations, Repub-
lican Era
Chart 8: Presidential Popular Vote & Supreme Court Confirmations, Repub-
lican Era
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President Herbert Hoover nominated Hughes and Parker at the end of 
that era (situation 3), and significantly, just as economic devastation of the 
Great Depression was beginning to take its toll on the nation. The Senate’s 
rejection of Parker marked the brief interruption of an extended period of 
successful confirmations. It had been thirty-six years since the Senate had 
voted to deny another nominee a seat on the high bench, and it would be 
thirty-eight years before it would do so again.
D. New Deal Period
Just as the Republicans excelled in the elections of previous era, 
Democrats dominated the New Deal era. Wilson was the only Democrat 
elected during the Republican era—as a result of a divided GOP in 1912—
and five-star general Dwight D. Eisenhower would be the only Republican 
to capture the White House during the New Deal period. Even more so than 
the previous era, landslides defined presidential elections in these years. In 
seven of the nine elections between 1932 and 1964, the victor won more 
than 80 percent of the electoral votes.
Chart 9: Presidential Popular Vote & Supreme Court Nominations, New 
Deal Period
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Chart 10: Presidential Popular Vote & Supreme Court Confirmations, New 
Deal Period
In turn, Supreme Court selections faced little hostility in the Senate. In 
fact, only one nominee garnered sufficient opposition to meet the definition 
of a contested nomination; that nominee was the last of the New Deal era. 
In the midst of the 1968 presidential race and in the aftermath of the assas-
sination of Robert F. Kennedy, Chief Justice Earl Warren decided to retire 
in hopes of allowing President Lyndon B. Johnson (and not the likely Re-
publican nominee Richard Nixon) to select his replacement. Johnson, 
against protests calling for the next President to choose the next Chief Jus-
tice, sought to elevate Associate Justice Abe Fortas to the Court’s center 
chair. It did not go well. Senators used the Fortas hearings as a vehicle for 
critiquing the Court’s recent groundbreaking doctrinal shifts, particularly in 
the area of criminal law.37 With forty-three senators supporting a filibuster 
of the nomination and only forty-five calling for a vote, Fortas’s chances to 
become chief died in the Senate on the first day of October 1968. LBJ 
37. See generally LIVA BAKER, Miranda: CRIME, LAW, AND POLITICS (1983); LAURA KALMAN,
ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY (1990); MCMAHON, supra note 31.
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withdrew the nomination the next day. Of course, the Fortas defeat fits with 
the principles outlined above since it occurred in the final moments of the 
New Deal period (situation 3). The next era would not be so kind to candi-
dates for the High Court.
E. Divided Government Era
In the nearly three-quarters of a century between 1894 and 1968, the 
Senate had rejected only one Supreme Court nominee. In the year and a 
half between October 1968 and April 1970, it would reject three: Fortas 
(1968), Clement Haynsworth (1969), and G. Harrold Carswell (1970). Lat-
er in this period, the Senate rejected another nominee (Robert Bork in 
1987) and President Ronald Reagan withdrew another nomination (Doug-
las Ginsburg, also in 1987). Additionally, three successful nominations 
were contentious: William Rehnquist’s appointment to be Associate Justice 
in 1971; Rehnquist’s elevation to Chief in 1986; and Clarence Thomas’s 
nomination to Associate in 1991. Three of the four defeats (Fortas belong-
ing to the previous era) do not fit the patterns outlined above. Richard Nix-
on nominated both Haynsworth and Carswell soon after his election to the 
presidency. However, given the time it took for the Senate to consider and 
then reject Haynsworth, the Carswell defeat does not fall within the one-
year period after a close election as defined above for situation 2. Addition-
ally, both the Bork defeat and the Ginsburg withdrawal occurred in the 
autumn of 1987, before the election year of 1988 (and therefore outside the 
definition of situation 1). Finally, none of the contested confirmations oc-
curred in any of the four situations outlined in Table 2.
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Chart 11: Presidential Popular Vote & Supreme Court Nominations, Di-
vided Government Era
Chart 12: Presidential Popular Vote & Supreme Court Confirmations, 
Divided Government Era
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Therefore, the principles that defined when the Senate would most 
likely contest a nominee for the Supreme Court for the better part of Amer-
ican history changed dramatically during this period, beginning early with 
Nixon’s third choice for the Court. Also, as noted above, this period in-
cluded the first nominee confirmed by a majority of senators who had gar-
nered fewer votes in their most recent elections than those in opposition 
(Clarence Thomas). That trend would continue in the next period of politi-
cal polarization.
F. Polarization Period
As noted earlier, in one sense, the current situation of a more polarized 
confirmation process is not unprecedented. Like today, past periods of con-
firmation conflict have come at times when the winning presidential candi-
date did not receive a majority of the overall vote in a two-candidate race, 
and did not win the popular vote by more than 5 percent.
Chart 13: Presidential Popular Vote & Supreme Court Nominations, Po-
larization Period
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Chart 14: Presidential Popular Vote & Supreme Court Confirmations, 
Polarization Period
But in another sense, the confirmation process has reached a new 
stage of contentiousness. Since George W. Bush’s nomination of Harriett 
Miers in 2005, every nominee has been contested in the Senate. Two ap-
pointees—Miers and Barack Obama’s choice of Merrick Garland—have 
been withdrawn without the benefit of a Senate vote of any kind. And two 
are “minority Justices,” having secured confirmation with a majority of 
senators who had received fewer votes in their most recent elections than 
those in opposition (as displayed in Table 1).
IV. CONCLUSION: THE COURT’S LEGITIMACY IN THE ERA OF 
POLITICAL POLARIZATION
What does this reality mean for the legitimacy of the Court? Does it 
matter that three of the sitting Justices fit the label of “minority Justices”? 
Moreover, does it matter that the three—Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, 
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and Neil Gorsuch—are the three most conservative Justices on the Court?38
After all, given that the Constitution apportions two senators to every state, 
it should not be surprising that close votes in the Senate produce skewed 
results with regard to the total of number of votes senators garnered in their 
most recent elections. For example, it is simply not possible for a senator 
from a state with the population size of Wyoming to come even close to 
winning the same number of votes to a senator from a thickly populated 
state like California. More importantly, the Framers constructed the Consti-
tution with that knowledge in mind. Indeed, many pieces of legislation 
passed by a narrow margin in the Senate likely have been supported by a 
majority of senators who had won fewer votes in their most recent elections 
than those in opposition.
Of course, the case of legislation is different than judicial nomina-
tions. Legislation also requires approval from the popularly-apportioned 
House of Representatives. And if the vote is close, the President’s signature 
(or acquiescence) is also required. The case of presidential appointments to 
the executive branch is perhaps a better comparison. With those confirma-
tions votes, the Senate acts without the aid of the House. And again, these 
nominees may secure confirmation with a majority of senators who had 
won fewer votes than those in opposition. But, of course, there is a differ-
ence between successful nominees for the executive branch and those for 
the federal judiciary, especially Justices of the Supreme Court. The former 
serve at the pleasure of the President, and rarely stay for extended periods 
of time. Judicial nominations are in this sense distinct, lasting the lifetime 
of the nominee or when he or she decides to step down. Perhaps more sig-
nificantly, they tend to stay on the bench for many years, even decades. For 
example, in the case of Supreme Court, the Justices appointed since 1969
who have completed their terms served nearly twenty-five years on aver-
age.
Given the activism of the Warren Court, one could argue that 
McCloskey’s conclusions that the Court “seldom strayed very far from the 
mainstreams of American life and [has] seldom overestimated its own 
power resources”39 ceased describing judicial decision-making soon after 
he wrote those words in 1960. But even so, the arrival of the concept of a 
“minority Justice” cast his conclusions in a different light, and adds another 
aspect to Graber’s notion of the “non-majoritarian difficulty.” Of course, 
only time will tell if this Court will “lag far behind or forge far ahead of 
38. For ideological scores of the Justices, see Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, MARTIN-
QUINN SCORES, mqscores.berkeley.edu [https://perma.cc/7M5B-7C77]
39. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 3.
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America”40 in the near future, or if it will behave in accordance with 
McCloskey’s conclusions of 1960.
40. Id. at 224.
